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The Rules on Conflict of Laws in the 
European Takeover Directive
by
Mathias M. Siems*
The rules on conflict of laws are the cornerstones of the new European Direc-
tive on Takeovers. The following article will critically, but overall positively
evaluate their solutions by way of comparison with the scope and applicability
of domestic takeover laws in Germany, France, the UK and the USA, concen-
trating in various manners on the real seat of the target, on the place of its
listing or on the residence of the shareholders. 
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I. Introduction
The long struggle for a unified takeover law in Europe has finally led to the
Directive on Takeover Bids, which now has to be implemented into national
law over the next two years.1 The necessity of this Directive has particularly
* PD Dr. Mathias M. Siems, LL.M.; currently Fulbright Scholar, Harvard Law School,
Cambridge, MA, USA.
1 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council on
takeover bids, OJ L 142/12 of 30. 04. 2004; on the debate, see, e.g., Hansen, “When Less
would be More: The EU Takeover Directive in Its Latest Apparition”, 9 Colum. J. Eur. 
been supported by the argument that a level playing field was needed.2
Hitherto, some Member States have used their legal systems to erect or main-
tain barriers to market access, with the result that there is no European equi-
librium between bidder and target companies because companies from some
countries are better protected than others.3 There are also many further differ-
ences which can lead to conflicts between takeover regulations. For instance,
the rules on disclosure obligations, minimum offer periods, and mandatory
offers do not only vary in their mechanical and technical requirements, but
also demonstrate different attitudes towards the chances and risks of the
“market for takeovers” as such.4 Particularly, these differences create a prob-
lem for cross-border takeovers, because it is often impossible for a bidder to
comply with two or more regimes. 
However, this article will not deal with the question how the unification by
the Takeover Directive has reduced these substantive law problems, but will
instead analyse its rules on conflict of laws.5 The first reason for this is that,
even in the absence of uniform laws, takeovers have become increasingly
cross-border 6 so that the problem of the applicable law is also becoming 
increasingly topical. Secondly, on the crucial point of the protection of 
shareholders in takeovers, the “opt-out model” of Article 12 leads to reduced
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L. 275 (2003); Hopt, “Takeover regulation in Europe – The battle for the 13th directive on
takeovers”, 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1, 8 et seq (2002); Skog, “The Take-
over Directive – an endless Saga?”, EBLR 2002, 301.
2 European Commission, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Expertise on
Issues Related to Takeover Bids from 10th January 2002, available at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/internal_market/ en/company/company/news/02-24.htm, pp. 2, 18 et seq; for
a critical view on this reasoning, see Hertig/McCahery, “Company and Takeover Law
Reforms in Europe:Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition?”,
EBOR 4 (2003) 179, 195 et seq.
3 See Hopt, supra (n 1), 7–8; Mitnick, “Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe:
Reforming Barriers To Takeovers”, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 683, 698–699.
4 See, e.g., Greene/Curran/Christman, “Toward a Cohesive International Approach to
Cross-Border Takeover Regulation”, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 823, 836 et seq (1997) (for the
US, the UK, France, and Germany); Karmel, “Transnational Takeover Talk – Regulations
Relating to Tender Offers and Insider Trading in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Australia”, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1133, 1135 et seq (1998); Baums/Thoma
(eds.), Takeover Laws in Europe, 2002; Payne (ed.), Takeovers in English and German
Law, 2002.
5 In this article, the US terminology “conflict of laws” is prefered to the (traditional) 
British terminology “international private law” (see, e.g, Collier, Conflict of Laws, 3rd
edition, 2001, pp. 5–6; Scoles/Hay/Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, 3rd edition, 2000, pp. 1
et seq) because takeover law is not about private law only.
6 See Mitnick, supra (n 3), 726.
harmonisation and thus increases the relevance of the rules on the conflict of
laws. Although it is said that the Directive is supposed to make safeguards for
the protection of members and other constituencies equivalent throughout
the Community (recital 1), this aim can be circumvented. The rules on the
duty of the board of the target (company) to remain neutral and on the break-
through of certain pre-takeover defences (Articles 9 and 11) only appear to be
the core of this new law.7 According to Article 12, Member States reserve the
right not to require their companies to comply with these provisions.8 Not
only structural and institutional barriers, such as the structure of the share
ownership or the German supervisory and co-determination system, but also
direct barriers, such as broad board discretion and multiple voting shares, can
therefore frustrate the unifying effect of the Directive.9 It is also not yet clear
whether the European Court of Justice will use its reasoning on golden
shares10 for other defence measures. Thirdly, the history of the Directive indi-
cates the importance of its cross border rules. Although the main controversy
focussed on the neutrality principle and the breakthrough rule, the fear that
takeovers by foreign companies may harm the domestic economy has been a
major concern of some Member States. Fourthly, the increasing relevance of
the rules on conflict of laws also corresponds to other recent developments in
European law. Differences in national laws (and thus the topic of conflict of
laws) are advanced by the principle of subsidiarity,11 and the concept of regu-
latory competition in company law, following the decisions of the European
Court of Justice in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art.12 Therefore it can
also be suggested that in takeover law only harmonisation of the rules on
conflict of laws is necessary because the market can evaluate the differences in
shareholder, stakeholder, and market protection.
460 ECFR 4/2004Mathias M. Siems
7 Cf. Chuah, “A New Framework For Takeover Bids In The EU”, 2002 F&CL 4.9(1)
(“Article 11 is indeed the core of the new proposals”).
8 However, the reciprocity clause (Article 12(3)) creates an incentive for companies
which have an active acquisition programme to opt into Articles 9 and 11.
9 Cf. Mitnick, supra (n 3), 699 et seq and Gilson, “The Political Ecology of Takeovers:
Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment”, 61
Fordham L. Rev. 161, 180 et seq (1992) who distinguish between structural and tech-
nical barriers.
10 ECJ, Case C-503/99 Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR. 4809; C-483/99 Commission
v.French Republic [2002] ECR.4781; C-367/98 Commission v.Portugal [2002] E.C.R. 4731;
for a comment, see, e.g., Adolff, “Turn of the Tide?: The “Golden Share” Judgements of
the European Court of Justice and the Liberalization of the European Capital Markets”,
3 German L.J. No. 8 (August 2002), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com.
11 See, Hopt, supra (n 1), 7.
12 See, below, III 1.
The following will analyse the rules on conflict of laws in the European Take-
over Directive in two parts. What has to be distinguished is the relationship
of European law to the law of other countries (i.e. the international/extra 
European rule), and the relationships between the laws of the Member States
themselves (i.e. the inter Member State/intra European rule). In both parts, 
I will also take US law into account. Not only has the United States a longer
tradition in takeover law, but also the coexistence between the unified federal
rules on tender offers and the diversified state rules on takeover defences may
provide a model for the development of takeover law in Europe. 
II. The Extra-European Rule
As to the relationship of European law to the law of other countries, it is 
said in Article 1 para. 1 that the Directive “lays down measures co-ordinating
the laws, regulations, administrative provisions, codes of practice or other 
arrangements of the Member States, including arrangements established by
organisations officially authorised to regulate the markets, relating to takeover
bids for the securities of a company governed by the law of a Member State,
where all or some of those securities are admitted to trading on a regulated
market within the meaning of Council Directive 93/22/EEC in one or more
Member States”. This means that the European Union has unilaterally defin-
ed the scope of its Directive. The Member States are free to include specific
rules in their takeover laws in order to decide which law is applied in other
cases.13 A comparison of the Directive with the existing German, British and
French Law (infra 1.) is, therefore, not only valuable for the understanding of
this European rule, but could also have a future validity. Furthermore, I am
going to take into account the distinctive rules of American takeover law 
(infra 2.) because their extraterritorial effect has been important and contro-
versial in the past.
1. Comparison with German, British and French Law
The existing German law states in § 1 WpÜG that it shall be applied to offers
for the acquisition of securities which were issued by a target company
(“Zielgesellschaft”) and are admitted to trading on an organised market 
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13 See, Zimmer, “Aufsicht bei grenzüberschreitenden Übernahmen”, ZGR 2002, 731, 737;
von Hein, “Grundfragen des europäischen Übernahmekollisionsrechts”, AG 2001,
213, 232.
(“organisierter Markt”).14 Following this, the terms “target company” and
“organised market” are defined. A target company is a company in the legal
form of a stock corporation (“Aktiengesellschaft”), or a partnership limited
by shares (“Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien”), which has its seat in Ger-
many (§ 2 para. 3 WpÜG). An organised market means official trading, or 
the regulated market on an exchange in Germany and the regulated market
within the meaning of the Council Directive 93/22/EEC in another State of
the European Economic Area (§ 2 para. 7 WpÜG).
This is quite similar to the European Directive. In both norms, there are two
requirements (EU/German company; admitted to trading in the EEA).
Furthermore, European as well as German law only deals with the applicab-
ility of its own law.15 This can lead to a positive or negative regulatory con-
flict. A positive conflict (or accumulation of norms) can arise if additionally
the law of another country is applicable whose legal system does not follow
the European or German approach, and extends its takeover law to foreign
companies. A negative conflict (or lack of norms) is possible if a company 
is only admitted in a country outside the European Union, and, similar to
European and German law, this country does not apply its rules because of a
domestic admission to trading only. A difference between European and
German law is that in German law the requirement of a domestic company is
more important than the admission to trading. Whereas in European law the
requirements of domestic (i.e. European) admission and seat are equally 
important, German law accepts a foreign admission (if it is European) but not
a foreign seat. 
This contrast between the seat of the company and the admission to trading
can also be identified in British and French law. The UK City Code on 
Takeover and Mergers applies to “offers for all listed and unlisted public
companies (and, where appropriate, statutory and chartered companies) con-
sidered by the Panel to be resident in the United Kingdom, the Channel Is-
lands or the Isle of Man”.16 This residence requirement means that, contrary
to the incorporation theory of the United Kingdom, the place of the real seat
462 ECFR 4/2004Mathias M. Siems
14 An English translation of the German WpÜG can be found at http://www.freshfields.
com/practice/corporate/publications/pdfs/4343.pdf.
15 Cf. for Germany: Versteegen, in: Hirte (ed.) Kölner Kommentar zum WpÜG, 2002, § 1
Rn 41; Hahn, Übernahmerecht und Internationales Privatrecht. Zur Anwendung des
WpÜG bei Übernahmen mit Auslandsbezug, RIW 2002, 741; for the EU Directive:
von Hein, supra (n 13), 232.
16 City Code No. 4(a) para. 2; see also Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern
Company Law, 7th edition, 2003, pp. 711–712.
is relevant in British takeover law. Its application does not depend on the 
listing of a company in the United Kingdom either. This is somewhat dif-
ferent in French law. If the securities of a non-French target are traded on a
French regulated market, the AMF (“Autorité des marchés Financiers”) has
discretion to determine whether it will require the bidder to commence a 
separate offer in France. Such as is the case in the law of other European
countries, there are, however, also provisions which are triggered if the target
is organised under French law.17
The rules on conflicts of laws in the EU Directive, as well as in German, Bri-
tish, and French takeover law, share the common feature that they only deal
with the applicability of their own law. This is contrary to the typical Euro-
pean approach to international private law, which tries to construct rules of
universal application in order to achieve uniformity of results. However, 
takeover law does not belong to private law in a narrow sense but has a rather
mixed character. With the exception of the Takeover Panel in the UK,18 the
involvement of a public body reveals its relation to the rules on international
public law,19 where, in principle, every country can only decide about the 
applicability of its own rules.20 Furthermore, the disclosure provisions are 
a typical part of capital market (financial market/securities) law. In capital
market law, as well as in other areas of economic law, the rules on conflict of
laws do not follow the neutral principle of the closest connection, because
their scope often depends on their content, namely the protection of the capi-
tal market and of the investors.21 Although the remaining rules on defensive
measures of directors and managers of the target belong to company law, the
same line of reasoning is possible in this respect. Since a cross border takeover
can be harmful for the country of the target, these effects can justify the fact
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17 See Zimmer, supra (n 13), 747–748; Nathan/Fischer/Ganguly, “An Overview of Take-
over Regimes in the United Kingdom, France and Germany and of the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and Council on Takeover Bids”, in: Practicing
Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order
No.B0-01TL, 947, 985–986; Merle, Droit commercial, Sociétés commercial, 9th edition,
2003, paras. 649 (footnote 3), 650.
18 Cf. Article 4 para. 1(2) of the Takeover Directive, which mentions public as well as pri-
vate bodies.
19 Cf. Versteegen, supra (n 15).
20 See, e.g., Meng, Extraterritoriale Jurisdiktion im öffentlichen Wirtschaftsrecht, 1994, 
pp. 201 et seq; Sonnenberger, in: MünchKommEGBGB, 3d edn., 1998, Einl. IPR para.
355 et seq
21 See, e.g., Zimmer, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht, 1996, pp. 45 et seq; Göthel, “Grenz-
überschreitende Reichweite ausländischen Kapitalmarktrechts”, IPRax 2000, 411, 415–
416.
that this question is also not being treated by the traditional rules of inter-
national private law. 
Apart from this common feature, European, German, British, and French
law use different rules. This is related to the debate about whether takeover
law is aimed at the protection of the target company, the capital market,
and/or the investors. The criteria of a domestic target company, as it is 
emphasised in UK law, can be explained by the fact that the chances and risks
of a takeover are most important for the constituencies of the target com-
pany.22 The shareholders have the opportunity to sell their shares to the bid-
der for a control premium, whereas the directors, managers, and employees
may try to prevent the takeover because they might lose their positions or
jobs. Conversely, the connecting factor of the place of listing, as in France, is
aimed at the protection of the domestic capital market. Since a functioning
market for corporate control can be seen as part of a strong capital market, a
country may foster this market and its investors by focussing on this aspect
of takeover law.23 The extra European rule in art. 1 of the Directive can there-
fore be seen as a compromise between these two approaches because both
factors are equally important. However, there might have also been a third
option. This would be the protection of domestic shareholders, and can be
explained by US law.
2. Comparison with US Law
The general approach of federal US securities law is that it is applicable if
there is “interstate commerce”.24 The courts, the SEC, and the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law have interpreted this extensively. What is decisive is
whether there is a significant effect or impact, and so merely preparatory acts
do not trigger jurisdiction. US securities law can therefore have an extraterri-
torial effect, because it might be regarded as sufficient if shareholders merely
live in the United States. With respect to tender offers, the rules which have
been enacted by the Williams Act regulate any tender offer made either 
“directly or indirectly, by use of the mail or by any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or
464 ECFR 4/2004Mathias M. Siems
22 Cf., Zimmer, supra (n 21), 100.
23 See also Zimmer, supra (n 21), 97.
24 See Karmel, supra (n 4), 1155 et seq; Perlmutter, “The New Rules on Cross-Border Ten-
der and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings: Competition
or Harmonization?”, 22 Mich. J. Int’l L. 169, 181 et seq; Meng, supra (n 20), 332 et seq;
Göthel, supra (n 21), 411 et seq.
otherwise”.25 In addition to listing, the Act can therefore reach any tender 
offer for a security made to a person in the United States.26
This approach has been criticised for several reasons. The direct line of criti-
cism is that the extraterritorial reach is an affront to the sovereignty of other
nations.27 This can also be supported by the “comity test” whereby nations
should have due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of their own citizens or of other persons who are under the protec-
tion of their laws.28 Indirectly, extraterritoriality may be criticised because it
reduces the choice of issuers and investors to opt into specific regulatory sets.
If US investors know that their investment in non-US companies triggers the
use of foreign rules, this competition among rules might lead to a “race to the
top”.29 However, counter-arguments are also feasible. It can be said that 
the extraterritorial reach will not harm the weaker foreign law. For instance, a
US decision has stated that “if our anti-fraud laws are stricter than Luxem-
bourg’s, that country will surely not be offended by their application.” 30
Moreover, the effect of regulatory competition can be questioned. It may
either not work, because investors typically do not have sufficient infor-
mation about foreign laws, or it may be harmful, because companies can
evade rules by takeover-law-shopping (“race to the bottom”).31
Recently however, there has been a change in US law. This was mainly caused
by the reactions to the extraterritorial scope of the rules on tender offers in
other countries. Although the US approach is intended to protect US share-
holders, it has often led to their discrimination. Since the Williams Act is
more onerous and the risk of securities fraud liability in the United States is
higher than in most other countries, US shareholders have often been exclud-
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25 15 U.S.C. § 78nd1 (1994).
26 See also Greene/Curran/Christman, supra (n 4), 833; Bourtin, “United States Regula-
tion of Foreign Takeovers”, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1609, 1616 et seq (1996) (analysing the case
law).
27 Fisch, “Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers”,
87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 523, 525 (1993).
28 See Perlmutter, supra (n 24), 185–186; on comity in modern conflict of laws in general,
see, e.g., Collins, in: Fawcett (ed.), Reform and Development of Private International
Law, Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North, 2002, p. 89.
29 Romano, The Advantage of Competitive Federalism for Securities Regulation, 2002; see
also Karmel, supra (n 4), 1169; Greene/Curran/Christman, supra (n 4), 867; Perlmutter,
supra (n 24), 202–203.
30 IIT (An International Investment Trust) v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2nd Cir. 1980).
31 Cf. Schneider, “Internationales Kapitalmarktrecht”, AG 2001, 269, 277; see also note
60, below.
ed in bids from non US companies.32 US shareholders were, therefore, dis-
abled from participation in the control premium which is usually granted in
takeovers. For this reason, the Cross Border Rules of the SEC now allow
some foreign companies to exempt themselves from US rules. When US
shareholders hold less than 10 % of the shares, bidders need only provide an
English version of the disclosure prepared under foreign law (“Tier I Exemp-
tion”). When more than 10 % but less then 40 % are held by US shareholders,
disclosure must be made according to US rules, but relief is available from a
variety of procedural requirements (“Tier II Exemption”).33
As a result, it can be said that the cautious European approach (seat and 
admission to trading in the European Union) is, in general, different from the
broad US approach. However, the extraterritoriality of the US law on tender
offers has now been reduced. The problems that might arise because both,
European and US law, could be applied, or because US shareholders are
excluded, are therefore becoming less important. Since the European Direc-
tive requires the Member States to improve disclosure, it may also in the 
future be the case that the United States provides a general exemption if the
implemented European law is applicable. The broad US concept does, how-
ever, also still prevent the problem that no law is applicable. This lack of
norms can be the case when an EU company is only registered in the United
States because the EU Directive is not applicable.34 Finally, it has to be borne
in mind that the US federal law on tender offers is not about antitakeover
defences, because these mechanism are regulated in corporate state law. Since
this depends on the law of the target,35 an accumulation or lack of norms does
not arise.
3. Conclusions
Although it is difficult to sum up a universal trend, some general conclusions
can be drawn. 
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32 See Greene/Curran/Christman, supra (n 4), 825 et seq; Karmel, supra (n 4), 1165; Lan-
der, “SEC Rules for Cross-Border Tender Offers, Exchange Offers, and Business Com-
binations”, International Lawyer 2002, 237.
33 For more details and further exemptions, see, e.g., Lander, supra (n 32), 237; Perlmutter,
supra (n 24), 189 et seq; Greene/Curran/Christman, supra (n 4), 833.
34 As mentioned above (II pr.), this, however, does not exclude the scope of broader rules
on conflict of laws in the Member States.
35 See, below, III 1.
First of all, the rules on the international conflict of takeover laws do not 
distinguish between private law and public law, company and capital market
law, and investor and market protection. Since these distinctions might be
difficult to draw and not uniform in different countries, it is generally pre-
ferred to have one set of rules. However, this will change if the intra-Euro-
pean rules are taken into account (infra Part III 2).
Secondly, the country of the target is, in general, the most important connect-
ing factor. An approach which focuses on the market where the company is
admitted to trading or the residence of the shareholders, becomes increas-
ingly problematic, because capital markets are becoming progressively trans-
national or even global.36 As even the United States could not maintain a law
which included all domestic shareholders, this is less likely to happen in other
countries. The connecting factor of the place where the company is admitted
to trading37 does not provide a good alternative. Companies may be listed on
several stock exchanges, they may decide to get delisted from one exchange
later on, stock exchanges may merge, or alternative trading systems may 
replace them to some extent. The place of “the” admission to trading be-
comes therefore difficult to ascertain, and the rules on this conflict can be 
arbitrary. Once again, this will, however, be questioned in the intra European
context, because Article 4 of the Directive contains some rules on multiple 
listing (infra Part III 2).
Thirdly, a different treatment of domestic and foreign shareholders, as hap-
pened in the case of US shareholders, will, at best, be an exception. Even if 
takeover law does allow discrimination,38 this has to be executed in a narrow
sense. In the increasingly free capital market, investors are probably the most
powerful constituency of a company and will not accept a situation in which
shareholders of the same company are treated differently in takeovers.
Furthermore, the current legal trend indicates that cross border aspects must
not harm shareholders. For instance, the possibility of a “global share”39 and
the enabling of cross border voting40 show that the law will progressively 
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36 Similar: Schneider, supra (n 31), 274.
37 Mülbert, “Übernahmerecht zwischen Kapitalmarkt und Aktien(konzern-)recht – die
konzeptionelle Schwachstelle des RegE WpÜG”, ZIP 2001, 1221, 1228–1229.
38 See Perlmutter, supra (n 24), 172, 215–216; Schneider, supra (n 31), 276-277; Hahn, supra
(n 15), 743; see also § 24 WpÜG.
39 For details see Schmitz, Die Umstellung von Inhaber- auf Namensaktien durch deut-
sche Aktiengesellschaften, 2002, pp. 181 et seq.
40 The existing problems are analysed by the Expert Group on Cross-Border Voting in
Europe, Final Report, 2002, available at http://www.minjust.nl:8080/b_organ/wodc/.
follow the internationalisation of the economy.41 Lastly, the problem of the
anonymity of the shareholder, and thus predictability and certainty must not
be disregarded. It is by no means clear that companies know who their share-
holders are.42 In particular, in the cross border context, layers of inter-
mediaries may make it impossible to ascertain where the ultimate investor 
comes from. 
Fourthly, international harmonisation of the rules on conflict of laws might
be desirable but unlikely. Due to differences in conflict of laws there can be
an accumulation or lack of norms. The current status of the laws demon-
strates, however, that the dissimilar approaches often depend on differences
in economic power. The United States can use an extensive application of its
law which, at least to some extent, has to be accepted by other countries. Con-
versely, small countries, such as Switzerland and Austria, have deliberately
chosen a narrow approach in order to avoid an accumulation of norms.43
Furthermore, the acceptance of a foreign law often, in practice, depends on its
content. From a theoretical point of view, it might be said that shareholders
should also have the choice to buy shares of companies if the law of the coun-
try of this company does not protect them in takeovers. If these rules are
transparent, the shares may be traded at a discount, and shareholders can take
this trade-off deliberately into account. However, following the current dis-
cussion about shareholder protection, it is more likely that the law of the
country of the target is not respected if investors are disadvantaged.44 There-
fore, it would be naive to assume that one proposal concerning the conflict of
takeover laws will find favour in all countries.45
As to the discretion that the Takeover Directive leaves the Member States 
(see II pr.), I would recommend that the remaining regulatory conflicts
should be addressed by flexible rules. First, a rule that excludes certain share-
holders may be helpful in order to prevent the applicability of two takeover
laws.46 Secondly, the national rules on conflict of laws can be made to depend
on foreign rules in order to prevent the applicability of no takeover law. For
instance, a law may start with the “double standard” of domestic incorpora-
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41 This point (“Konvergenz durch Kongruenz”) is elaborated in Siems, Die Konvergenz
der Rechtssysteme im Recht der Aktionäre (2004), at § 8 (not yet published).
42 See Siems, “Der anonyme Aktionär – The anonymous shareholder – L’actionnaire
anonyme”, ZGR 2003, 218; for to the practice in the United States, see Perlmutter, supra
(n 24), 199 et seq.
43 See Zimmer, supra (n 13) 745.
44 Karmel, supra (n 4) 1134; see also Greene/Curran/Christman, supra (n 4), 860–861.
45 Greene/Curran/Christman, supra (n 4), 871–872.
46 This is already the case in Germany, see § 24 WpÜG.
tion and listing, but may also accept one of these requirements if otherwise 
a company could completely evade takeover law at all.47 The price for this
connection to foreign law would be that, contrary to the starting point of
conflict on takeover laws (see 1.), it would indirectly not only deal with the
applicability of its own law. As international harmonisation is unlikely, it is,
however, submitted that this second best solution is the most reasonable.
III. The Intra-European Rules
The relationship between the takeover laws of the Member States is regulated
in Article 4 of the European Directive on Takeovers. Unlike the extra-Euro-
pean rule, this is formulated in a rather complex manner. A simple “basic
rule” (Article 4 para. 2(a)) applies if the registered office and the country of
the listing are identical (infra 1.). Otherwise, the “complex rule” (Article 4
para. 2(b)–(e)) decides not only how foreign and multiple listings will be dealt
with, but also distinguishes between the rules which address company law
and the rules which address capital market law issues (infra 2.). Once again,
the following will take US law into account. In the United States as well as in
the European Union there is (or will be) more uniformity in the areas of 
disclosure and minimum bid periods, than there is with respect to anti-take-
over defences. The US debate on this topic can therefore be valuable for the
forthcoming European situation.
1. The “Basic Rule”
The first paragraph of Article 4 says that Member Sates “shall designate the
authority or authorities competent for supervising a bid for the purposes of
the rules made or introduced pursuant to this Directive”. In the second para-
graph it is then laid down that the “authority competent for supervising the
bid shall be that of the Member State in which the offeree company has its 
registered office if the securities of that company are admitted to trading on a
regulated market in that Member State” (Article 4 para. 2(a)). Although this
wording only deals with the competent supervisory authority, this does not
mean that the rules on conflict of laws are not harmonised at all. This is 
already indicated by Article 4’s heading “Supervisory authority and applicable
law”. Furthermore, this can be inferred from Article 4 para. 2(e).48 In this
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subparagraph the applicable law is determined for the cases in which a com-
pany is incorporated and listed in two different countries. It would, however,
not make sense that the Directive regulates the rules on conflict of laws in this 
exceptional case, whereas in the ordinary case, in which both countries 
are identical, the supervisory authority could choose the law of a different
country. This link between questions concerning the competent authority
and those about the applicable law, is also not atypical of takeover law. As in
other parts of economic law, it is coherent that national authorities apply
their own law only.49 In this respect, Article 4 para. 2(a) has also been called 
a “unilateral rule”.50 However, I think that this wording can be misleading.
Article 4 para. 2 as a whole is not about the applicability of the Takeover Di-
rective, but concerns the remaining diversity in the law of the Member States.
Unlike the international rules on conflict of laws 51, it is therefore not
motivated by the fact that a specific statute defines its scope unilaterally but
can rather be seen in the tradition of international private law rules which try
to achieve uniformity of results.
It has further been said that the Member States have discretion in defining the
term “seat” in Article 4 para. 2(a).52 This is based on the German wording of
the Takeover Directive, which only talks about the “Sitz” (seat), whereas the
English version uses the term “statutory seat”. In general, this linguistic dis-
crepancy produces the same results. For instance, the German “real seat doc-
trine” does not look at the real seat only but requires that the real seat and the
statutory seat are identical. Therefore, the English version does not exclude
the German “real seat doctrine” because German companies must also have
their statutory seat in Germany. However, with respect to UK law, it can be
said that the German and the English versions lead to diverse results. On the
one hand, the residence-test of the City Code53 could be in compliance with
the Directive, since “residence” could be seen as a valid definition of “seat”
according to the German version. On the other hand, the term “statutory
seat” in the English version could refer to the British “incorporation theory”
so that regardless of their (real) residence, all companies which are incorporat-
ed in the UK were included. 
In my opinion, Article 4 para. 2(a) is to be read as “registered seat”. The Ger-
man terminology does not oppose this, because the term “Sitz” typically also
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refers in German statutes to the seat according to the registration (see, e.g., 
§ 5 para. 1 AktG, § 4a para. 1 GmbHG)54. The City Code has, therefore, to be
changed in order to comply with European law. With respect to Germany
and other countries which have so far followed the real seat doctrine, the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice in Centros, Überseering and 
Inspire Art 55 have to be taken into account. This means that, in general, a
country must not discriminate against an EU company because its real and
statutory seat are not identical. I do not think that takeover law is an ex-
ception to this case law.56 Since the acceptance of the defensive measures by
the target, which will probably stay diverse in the European Union, is part of
company law, there is no reason why the reasoning by the European Court of
Justice is not applicable. Furthermore, it is not a conclusive counter-argu-
ment to suggest, that this may enable companies to choose their statutory seat
and a pro forma listing deliberately in a country in which there is neither their
main business nor the main trading of their shares.57 The criticism of the 
evasion of particular regulations can also be seen as a desirable form of regu-
latory competition. Since defensive structures have to be transparent (Article
10 of the Directive), shareholders know the specific significance of the market
for corporate control before they invest in a specific company in a specific
Member State.
In this respect, it can also be useful to look at US research into market forces
in takeover law. Unlike the US federal rules on tender offers, there is some 
diversity in the use of antitakeover statutes, which are mainly aimed at pro-
tecting domestic targets from cross border takeovers.58 Since corporations
can choose in which state they will be incorporated, it is debatable whether
this competition will lead to an increased protection of shareholders in take-
over law. On the one hand, this can be assumed since Delaware, the most 
successful state in attracting corporations, has no anti-takeover statute. On
the other hand, it has recently been suggested that also states which amass
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anti-takeover statutes are successful in the incorporation market.59 From a
European perspective, a “race to the bottom” in takeover law60 is not very 
likely. The applicable law depends not only on the seat of a company, but also
on the place of its listing. Although Article 4 para. 2(a) also applies to com-
panies which are listed on stock exchanges in several countries and have their
registered office in one of them,61 it is doubtful whether takeover law is 
important. A multiple or re-listing is typically done for other reasons.62
Furthermore, it is, for instance, improbable that a British “plc” listed at the
LSE would try to evade the strong neutrality principle of the City Code by
changing its statutory seat to Greece and a listing on the Athens stock
exchange. Finally, it is no coincidence that the decisions of the European
Court of Justice in Centros and Inspire Art have dealt with new small com-
panies incorporated as British “ltd’s”. Regarding existing bigger companies,
for which the takeover rules are more important, there are higher barriers to
regulatory competition, because they would have to be re-incorporated. So
far, the directives which would enable a direct cross-border transfer of the 
registered office,63 or an indirect change by a cross-border merger64 have not
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been enacted. An indirect change by founding a new company, transferring
all of its assets to it, and subsequently winding up the old company is ex-
cluded in practice, because national tax law typically requires the taxation of
the hidden assets of the existing company.65 It is not yet entirely clear whether
the law, which in many Member States requires the taxation of the hidden 
assets in the latter case, violates of the freedom of establishment (art. 43, 48 of
the EC Treaty). The European Court of Justice has recently decided with 
respect to European citizens that the transfer of their residence must not lead
to the taxation of an unrealized capital gain.66 Therefore, it is possible that a
discrimination imposed by tax law would also be unlawful for corporations
which indirectly transfer their statutory seat by transferring their assets.67
2. The “Complex Rule”
Article 4 para. 2(a) of the Directive does not regulate the case that the target is
an EU company which is not listed in the country of its registered seat. In 
order to avoid a lack of norms, Article 4 para. 2(b)–(e) provides specific rules
on these cases. In particular, it distinguishes between the law of the Member
State where the company has its registered office, and the law of the Member
State where it is listed. In matters relating “to the information to be provided
to the employees of the offeree company and in matters relating to company
law, in particular the percentage of voting rights which confers control 68 and
any derogation from the obligation to launch a bid, as well as the conditions
under which the board of the offeree company may undertake any action
which might result in the frustration of the bid”, the (former) “home law”
governs (Article 4 para. 2(e,2)). Matters relating to the “consideration offered
(…), in particular the price, and matters relating to the bid procedure, (…) the
information on the offeror’s decision to make a bid, the contents of the offer
document and the disclosure of the bid”, are dealt with the (latter) “market
law” (Article 4 para. 2(b,1)(e,1)). With regard to this law of the market, the
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manner in which multiple listings will be treated also had to be clarified: In
general, what is decisive is where the securities were first admitted (Article 4
para. 2(b,2)). If securities were admitted simultaneously, the target can deter-
mine which law will be applied (Article 4 para. 2(c)). This has also to be made
public (Article 4 para. 2(d)).
These rules could be endorsed as a good compromise between the inter-
national differences in conflict of takeover laws, as well as between the dif-
ferent interests of the home and the market country. Furthermore, they re-
solve the problem whereby in the European Union no law might applicable.
This can be illustrated by the case of an Austrian company which is only
listed in Frankfurt and London.69 Since, at present, Austrian takeover rules
require an Austrian listing, and German and British rules require a domestic
company, none of them is applicable. However, in the future, the European
Directive will lead to the applicability of Austrian law as home law and, de-
pending on the course of events or the choice of the company, German or
British law as market law. 
Despite this improvement, it is doubtful whether this “complex rule” is the
best solution. The scission (“dépeçage”; “Spaltung”) between company and
capital market law is highly problematic. Although the examples give some
guidelines, it is still uncertain how the different authorities will understand
the scope of these legal areas.70 On the one hand, a broad approach on com-
pany law can be supported because joint-stock companies have the particular
purpose that they can use the capital market.71 On the other hand, capital
market law can also regulate areas of company law, because the aim of pro-
tecting investors may, for instance, justify rules on proxy voting or on the
proper corporate governance of a listed company.72 Furthermore, it is not a
convincing argument that, in case of multiple listings, the applicable law
depends on the first listing and the choice of the company. The priority of the
listing of the target is arbitrary, because it does not indicate which market and
which investors are mostly affected. The choice option is even less persuasive.
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In the debate on the proper connecting factor in international takeover law, a
contractual theory has rightly been refused, because takeover law is not a part
of ordinary private law.73 Nor can this choice be inferred from the idea of 
regulatory competition. The concept of regulatory competition means that
you can opt into the rules of one particular legal system, but not that you 
can freely combine the law of different countries (i.e., no “Rosinentheo-
rie” 74). 
3. Conclusions
As in the previous part of this article, some general conclusions can be drawn. 
First, Article 4 para. 2 of the Takeover Directive leads, in general, to an im-
provement of the intra-European rules on conflict of laws. These new rules
will eliminate the lack or accumulation of norms in the European Union.
Furthermore, the basic rule in Article 4 para. 2 and the decisions of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice do not leave any discretion to the Member States in
how they define the term “(regulatory) seat”. Consequently, there can be
some regulatory competition for the best takeover law. This will not lead to a
“race to the bottom”, because re-incorporations are not easy, and a deliberate
evasion of one particular law is not necessarily harmful.
Secondly, the Takeover Directive is, however, not perfect. I would suggest
that a single rule which focuses on the seat of the target is preferable to the
complex and arbitrary rules in Article 4 para. 2(b)–(e). Since capital markets
are increasingly transnational or even global, the relevance of the place where
the company is listed is decreasing. In the European Union, it is also im-
portant to be aware that the Directive leads to more convergence in the field
of capital market law, than in the company law question of antitakeover 
measures. It is, therefore, submitted that it is not necessary that the place of
the market where the company is listed should be used as a connecting factor.
The revision of the Directive (cf. Article 20) should thus consider a simplified
intra European rule on conflict of takeover laws. 
Thirdly, one might wonder if a unification of the extra- and intra-European
rules is useful. A single target rule would avoid the problem that EU com-
panies might look to be listed outside the EU, in order to circumvent the 
Takeover Directive.75 However, it is a controversial topic whether such uni-
fied rules are to be approved of. In the United States the rules on intra-US
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conflict of laws are distinctive because they are strongly influenced by the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the US constitution. However, it is also pro-
posed that international comity should be used in order to adjust the, often
disregarded, international rules on conflict of laws to the intra state rules.76
The recent trend in the European Union is, however, that the intra-European
rules of conflict of laws are increasingly influenced by the objectives of
European integration and substantive standards.77 It is, therefore, unlikely
that a proposed rule, which takes a completely unified approach, could be
successful.
IV. Summary
The rules on conflict of laws are the cornerstones of the new European Di-
rective on Takeovers. They can be divided into two parts. First, the relation-
ship of European law to the law of other countries is unilaterally defined in
Article 1 para. 1 of the Directive. Similarly to German law, but narrower than
British and French law, and quite different to US law, it is required that the
seat and the admission to trading of the company is in the European Union.
This can lead to a lack or accumulation of norms. Since international har-
monisation of the rules on conflict of takeover laws is unlikely, the Member
States should therefore use their remaining discretion in order to include 
flexible rules in their takeover law. Secondly, the relationship between the
takeover laws of the Member States is regulated in Article 4 para. 2 of the Di-
rective. A “basic rule” (lit. a) applies if the registered office and the country of
the listing are identical. Otherwise, the “complex rule” (lit. b–e) decides not
only how foreign and multiple listings will be dealt with, but also differen-
tiates between company and capital market law issues. The “basic rule” links
the questions of the competent authority and the applicable law. Further-
more, it is suggested that the case law of the European Court of Justice will
enable some regulatory competition for the best takeover law. The “complex
rule” avoids a lack of norms. However, it is submitted that a more straight-
forward solution, which is only based on the statutory seat of the target com-
pany, would have been preferable.
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